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INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain represents a critical and contested point of intersection
between government power and private property rights. As debates over
eminent domain have leapt from the pages of academic articles1 to legislatures2 and even to popular culture,3 the battle lines have largely crystal∗

Associate Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School. Thanks to Brooklyn Law School for
supporting this project.
1. Since Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005), much ink has been spilled
on the problem of eminent domain. The bibliography is far too vast to catalogue here. For
the leading pre-Kelo article, see Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
2. See generally Ilya Somin, The Limits of Backlash: Assessing the Political Response
to Kelo, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2100 (2009) (summarizing legislative responses).
3. See, e.g., Charles Isherwood, A Brooklyn Civics Lesson, Offered in Word and Song,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 2010, at C1 (“As subjects for musical comedy go, it would be hard to
fathom anything less promising than the legal intricacies of the concept of eminent domain.
. . . Yet [it is] rhapsodized in song with style and wit in the spirited new show from the Civilians . . . .”).
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lized. Most people now seem to agree that eminent domain, for better or
worse, is primarily a tool for the government to use to assemble property
and overcome holdouts.4 In this Essay, I argue that an entirely different interest is also at stake. Eminent domain serves an important structural role
in American democracy—ensuring that governments are not bound by the
policy choices of their predecessors.5 In this account, eminent domain is a
tool for acquiring not just property, but also democratic legitimacy.
It is a core principle of democracy that one government is not allowed to
make policy choices for future governments.6 Democratic power requires
that a representative government be responsive to the will of its own constituents, not the constituents of the past. For that reason, legislatures are not
allowed to pass unrepealable legislation, and constitutions contain mechanisms for amendment.7 Despite the prohibition on entrenchment, as it is
usually called, governments have many tools at their disposal to propel
their policy preferences into the future.8 Among the most powerful but
least theorized are those that rely on private rights. Long-term government
contracts, physical developments, and property conveyances in many forms
can lock in policy preferences beyond a single legislative lifecycle.9 Faced
with incorporeal and physical manifestations of past policies, eminent domain is an important tool for subsequent governments to de-entrench those
preferences, buying back policy control from the past.

4. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124-25
(2004) (discussing holdout problem and eminent domain); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Hidden Function of Takings Compensation, 96 VA. L. REV. 1673, 1674
(2010); Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain, 105
MICH. L. REV. 101, 138 (2006).
5. See Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law: Binding Local
Governments, U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming) [hereinafter Serkin, Public Entrenchment] (on
file with author).
6. See Julian N. Eule, Temporal Limits on the Legislative Mandate: Entrenchment and
Retroactivity, 12 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 379, 381-404 (1987).
7. Tom Ginsburg & Eric A. Posner, Subconstitutionalism, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1583,
1599-1600 (2010) (discussing constitutional amendments in context of entrenchment).
8. Examples include bicameralism, staggered-term agency appointments, and the Constitution itself. See Michael C. Dorf, The Aspirational Constitution, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1631, 1631 (2009) (“[A] constitution burdens rather than benefits future generations by limiting their political freedom to choose policies that, in their judgment, best serve their interests.”); William N. Eskridge & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO.
L.J. 523, 528 (1992) (discussing bicameralism); Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems
and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1153, 1213 (2009) (identifying staggered-term appointments as mechanism for reducing political responsiveness of agency officials); see also Ginsburg & Posner, supra note 7, at
1586 (“[I]deas of entrenchment are central to the notion of constitutions.”).
9. See Serkin, Public Entrenchment, supra note 5, at 3 (discussing public entrenchment
through private law).
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This is not just abstract political theory. Indeed, viewed through the lens
of entrenchment, New York provides ready examples of eminent domain’s
role in changing policies adopted by previous governments. This Essay
examines some of those examples, and also current policies that future
governments might need eminent domain to undo. This Essay therefore
highlights a seldom-explored role for eminent domain: preserving the ability of New York’s elected representatives to respond to the will of the
people.
I. ENTRENCHMENT BY ANOTHER NAME
Eminent domain plays no obvious role in traditional debates about legislative entrenchment. Entrenchment, as typically conceived, refers to unrepealable legislation—that is, public laws that are binding into the future.10
Eminent domain is irrelevant in that context. But entrenchment concerns
should not be so narrowly construed. Indeed, the concerns animating prohibitions on entrenchment apply far more broadly than just to unrepealable
legislation, and once the range of entrenching government actions is expanded to include commitments made through private law, the importance
of eminent domain is easy to see.
In political science terms, anti-entrenchment rules are about preserving
sovereignty and democratic accountability. A genuinely democratic government must be able to respond to the will of its constituents, and that
means today’s constituents, not yesterday’s.11 There can be no democratic
accountability—indeed, there can be no sovereignty—if the power to act
has been captured by a previous government.12 Imagine a state passing a
meta law declaring that it, and all other existing laws, could never be
changed. What power would subsequent governments have? The very
idea of a government as rule maker would disappear. Governments’ powers are limited by the immutable policies they inherit.
The inter-temporal allocation of power is something of a zero sum game.
Allowing governments to decide their laws’ temporal reach would increase
the power—and, hence, the democratic responsiveness—of the enacting

10. See, e.g., Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Legislative Entrenchment: A Reappraisal, 111 YALE L.J. 1665, 1667 (2002) (defining entrenchment).
11. See Michael W. McConnell, Why Hold Elections? Using Consent Decrees to Insulate Policies From Political Change, 1987 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 295, 296 (“Future lawmakers
have just as much power to depart from the decisions of their forbears as their forbears had
to make the decisions in the first place.”).
12. See, e.g., Eule, supra note 6, at 392 (“If Parliament is to remain supreme, it must
necessarily retain the power to make or unmake any law.”).

SERKIN_CHRISTENSEN

1178

6/7/2011 7:03 PM

FORDHAM URB. L.J.

[Vol. XXXVIII

government.13 But it comes at the expense of future governments. Of
course, prohibiting entrenchment has the opposite effect, giving authority
to the present and divesting it from the past. Nevertheless, democracy has
a strongly presentist prejudice, and its concern is primarily with the ability
of the government to respond to the will of the people today, but only insofar as it preserves the power of future governments to be similarly responsive.
There is an important functional justification for anti-entrenchment rules
as well: preventing inter-temporal externalities. Some entrenching government actions allow a government to reap benefits today while shifting
the costs onto the future. Debt is perhaps the most familiar example.14
Politicians often refer to government borrowing as “mortgaging the future.”15 At the most general level, this concept is absolutely right. Debt of
any kind allows a government to collect a pile of cash today, while externalizing the costs of repaying onto future generations. A resulting temporal
misalignment of costs and benefits can be a recipe for political malfunction
and abuse.16
The underlying concerns about entrenchment exist, then, whenever one
government can make precommitments that are binding on the future. At
this level of generality, entrenchment is ubiquitous. Everything that a government does will limit future policy choices. Building out infrastructure,
like roads or mass transit, will determine the shape of future development,
as will forgoing such investments. Entrenchment concerns are most serious,
however, when a government, by making a specific policy precommitment,
can reap immediate benefits while shifting the costs to the future. It is easy
to identify some examples where entrenchment concerns are likely to be
particularly acute.
13. See, e.g., Posner & Vermeule, supra note 10, at 1672 (describing entrenchment as
increasing the power of a government to set policy).
14. See Richard Briffault, The Disfavored Constitution: State Fiscal Limits and State
Constitutional Law, 34 RUTGERS L.J. 907, 918 (2003); C. Dickerman Williams & Peter R.
Nehemkis, Municipal Improvements As Affected By Constitutional Debt Limitations, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 177, 182 (1937) (“[I]n any system of public economy bonded debt is merely a
means of allocating payment between the present and the future.”).
15. E.g., Billy House & Clifford Marks, Boehner Reacts Coolly to Geithner’s Warning
on Debt Limit, NAT’L J., Jan. 6, 2011 (“[W]e cannot continue to borrow recklessly, dig ourselves deeper into this hole, and mortgage the future of our children and grandchildren.”).
16. Where debt is used to finance investments that generate benefits for future generations—like roads, which generate positive inter-temporal externalities—debt can be a useful
tool for aligning costs and benefits. Nancy Staudt, Constitutional Politics and Balanced
Budgets, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 1105, 1141 (1998) (“The use of public debt to pay for capital
expenditures would distribute the cost of the long-lasting goods, among all the beneficiaries
throughout time.”). Indeed, without some mechanism for spreading costs over time, governments may under-invest in resources that generate significant benefits in the future.
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In addition to debt, long-term contracts can allow a government to secure an immediate benefit from a private counter-party while binding future governments to the terms of the contract. Whether a procurement contract for the provision of services or a development agreement promising
future regulatory treatment, the effect is the same: the government can obtain an immediate or short-term benefit by binding itself to some future
conduct.
Property arrangements can similarly generate immediate gains while
pushing costs forward. Selling off assets is one example.17 Privatizing
municipal functions can generate money (or other beneficial services) today, but lock the government into a private contract for the outsourced
good or service. More ephemeral property rights can also be entrenching.
A government that allows property rights to vest—whether development
rights, a public franchise, or pension benefits—creates rights that run
against subsequent governments and, in the process, locks in policy choices
surrounding land use policy or labor arrangements. Physical development,
too, can generate short-term gains and long-term policy constraints. A
government receives a short-term political and economic boost from siting
a new stadium or even just a big box store, but in the process limits subsequent governments’ ability to adopt a different strategy for economic development.
Of course, government actions are not necessarily inappropriate simply
because they are entrenching. The benefits of entering into binding precommitments can easily outweigh the costs. Return to the example of municipal debt. The ability to borrow money—whether through bonds or otherwise—depends fundamentally on the enforceability of the repayment
obligation. If every government could decide for itself whether to honor its
financial obligations, the cost of borrowing money would presumably become exorbitant.18 Likewise, all governments would be worse off without
some capacity to enter into long-term procurement contracts, which allow
them to minimize risks of price fluctuations and supply disruptions. The
point is simply this: many government actions implicate a particularly
complicated trade-off between short-term benefits and long-term costs.
There is reason to worry that government actors are not incentivized to balance these appropriately, and so long-term government precommitments

17. See Julie Roin, Privatization and the Sale of Tax Revenues, 95 MINN. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (discussing similarity between selling assets and incurring debt).
18. See Stewart Sterk, The Continuity of Legislatures: Of Contracts and the Contracts
Clause, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 647, 699 (1988) (“When a legislature repudiates a contract, it
demoralizes its contract partners, and that demoralization is likely to make future legislative
contracting—even if efficient—more difficult or expensive.”).
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can create private law obligations that inappropriately limit future policy
choices.
The risk of inter-temporal power grabs has given rise to various legal
responses. There are some actions that governments simply cannot undertake. Most directly, governments cannot enact unrepealable legislation. A
subsequent government can always change the law. But other kinds of protections are in place that prevent entrenchment in its other forms. For example, state constitutions often impose substantive limits on indebtedness
and also provide complex procedural hurdles that a government must clear
before incurring general recourse debt.19 These arose out of a realization in
the nineteenth century that governments have an incentive to borrow too
heavily against the future.20 Similarly, governments cannot enter into enforceable contracts promising future regulatory treatment.21 The only notable exceptions are development agreements, which generally require statutory authorization and then include significant procedural protections to
minimize the risk of political malfunction.22
In general, though, outright prohibitions on government actions are few
and far between. They operate at the fringe to take the most extreme entrenchment risks off the table, but do not address the more run-of-the-mill
government actions that can nevertheless impose significant costs and policy constraints on the future. More important, then, are the legal doctrines
that protect subsequent governments’ ability to change course, even if at
some financial or political expense.
Chief among these is the general inapplicability of injunctive relief
against governments for breach of contract.23 A government cannot be
forced to continue performing under a contract, so long as it compensates
the injured party for the breach. More subtly, but perhaps even more pro-

19. See Briffault, supra note 14, at 915-16 (surveying approaches to debt limits); Clayton Gillette, Fiscal Home Rule, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1241, 1255-56 (2009) (describing history of debt limits).
20. E.g., Briffault, supra note 14, at 918 (“A central justification of constitutional limits
on debt is to offset the temptations that can cause elected officials to burden future generations with unnecessary debt.”); Sterk, supra note 18, at 720-21 (“[The] very existence [of
debt limits] demonstrates that the attempt to develop institutional mechanisms to cope with
the problem of legislative discontinuity has been longstanding.”).
21. E.g., Janice C. Griffith, Local Government Contracts: Escaping From the Governmental/Proprietary Maze, 75 IOWA L. REV. 277, 379 (1990).
22. See Shelby D. Green, Development Agreements: Bargained-For Zoning That Is Neither Illegal Contract Nor Conditional Zoning, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 383, 396-99 (2004) (describing requirements).
23. E.g., Frank Easterbrook, Justice and Contract in Consent Judgments, 1987 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 19, 37 (“By and large even authorized contracts may not be specifically enforced
against governments.”).
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foundly, governments are not generally liable for expectation damages
when they breach contracts. Instead, and unlike private parties, they are
typically liable only for reliance damages—that is, the damages that the
counterparty actually incurred from relying on the government.24 In the
context of procurement contracts, courts will often imply a “termination for
convenience” clause, allowing the government to breach unilaterally by
paying only reliance damages.25 If the government no longer needs its
widget contract, it can terminate without paying full expectation damages.
Limits on contract remedies, however, do not protect governments from
all kinds of inherited precommitments. Breach is no relief from the entrenching effect of vested rights or from actual development. In these contexts, something stronger is needed to preserve flexibility for future governments, and that something is eminent domain. In addition to the power
to take real property, eminent domain applies to vested development rights,
contract rights, and also more esoteric future interests in property. Eminent
domain allows a government to change course on the use of property and
on matters of urban policy from the location of adult uses to transportation
and other infrastructure. It is, in short, a de-entrenching tool of last resort,
and its availability is a backstop to the power of government to decide policy for itself and not to be tied to the preferences of the past.
II. EMINENT DOMAIN IN NEW YORK
This symposium’s topic, eminent domain in New York, provides a useful opportunity to examine actual examples of a government using eminent
domain to change a prior government’s policy decision. The goal here is to
provide a cross-section of examples that is as broad as possible with regard
to the nature of the policy at issue and the kind of property being taken. It
also includes different temporal perspectives, identifying some instances
where the city has exercised eminent domain to reverse a policy decision,
and others in which the city has recently adopted a policy (or is considering
adopting a policy) that would require eminent domain in the future to undo.
Admittedly, not all of the examples below present the issue as cleanly as
one might hope. Some involve merely the threat of eminent domain, some
involve contestable claims about the content of earlier governments’ policy
choices, and some rely on events that almost but did not quite come to pass.

24. Daniel R. Fischel & Alan O. Sykes, Governmental Liability for Breach of Contract,
1 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 313, 354-57 (1999); Richard H. Seamon, Separation of Powers and
the Separate Treatment of Contract Claims Against the Federal Government for Specific
Performance, 43 VILL. L. REV. 155, 212-13 (1998).
25. Harold J. Krent, Reconceptualizing Sovereign Immunity, 45 VAND. L. REV. 1529,
1567 n.150 (1992).
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Nevertheless, all of the examples at least gesture at the role that eminent
domain did play, could have played, or might still play in preserving a government’s power to decide policy for itself.
A.

The Built Environment

The most straightforward examples of the de-entrenching power of eminent domain involve changes in land use policy that rely on eminent domain to alter the built environment. At the most general level, the problem
of existing uses has been around for as long as zoning.26 The constraints of
established land uses can transform forward-looking land use planning into
a mere codification of pre-existing development patterns.27
Of course, the point of land use policy is to stimulate private development consistent with the government’s plans and priorities. A government
can reap substantial benefits from that private reliance, whether political
benefits from developers or property owners, financial benefits from exactions and other developer concessions, or general benefits from a temporary
uptick in economic activity through the development itself. But in the face
of those immediate gains, governments (and government actors) may be
insufficiently attentive to the costs of the development down the road. In
those situations, eminent domain can be a critical tool for implementing
prospective changes in land use policy where prior policies have resulted in
private development that is inconsistent with new plans and priorities. Two
examples come readily to mind: Times Square, and the New York City waterfront.
1.

Rejuvenating Times Square

Adult uses pose a particular urban policy challenge to local governments, and New York City is no exception. First Amendment rules established by the Supreme Court prevent a government from banning adult uses
altogether and allow regulating them only to prevent secondary effects.28
Responding to these limits, local governments have adopted one of two diametrically opposed land use strategies. Some have sought to exclude
adult uses from most parts of a municipality in order to limit the neighbor-

26. See Christopher Serkin, Existing Uses and the Limits of Land Use Regulations, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1222, 1236 (2009) [hereinafter Serkin, Existing Uses] (noting that existing
use problems were discussed during the formation of the Standard Zoning Enabling Act of
1926).
27. Id. at 1225 n.7 (citing sources).
28. See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 434 (2002)
(noting that ordinances aimed at secondary effects of adult entertainment on the surrounding
community can be valid); City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
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hoods exposed to them. This, of course, has the effect of concentrating
adult uses in a few places. Others have sought to disperse concentrated
adult uses to prevent the development of a red light district or skid row.29
In the 1970s, New York City was squarely in the prior camp. Indeed, in
1976, responding to concerns about the proliferation of adult uses in new
neighborhoods, New York City adopted a zoning ordinance relegating
“adult physical culture establishments” to Times Square.30 This was a deliberate policy decision to protect other residential and commercial districts
from adult uses, and the effect was obvious to any Times Square visitor.
Within a few years, however, New York City decided to change course.
In the 1980s, under Mayor Ed Koch, the City initiated a redevelopment
plan that called for dispersing the adult uses in Times Square.31 The existing adult businesses, however, were entitled to constitutional protection
against zoning changes.32 A central component of the plan therefore called
for condemning some of the adult uses and breaking up their concentrated
hold on the neighborhood.33 Eminent domain was a central tool in reversing the policy decision to concentrate adult uses in Times Square and
helped to implement the new policy of dispersing them throughout the City
to reclaim Times Square.
Whatever the relative merits of these two approaches—and reasonable
minds continue to disagree—the entrenchment point is simply this: different governments may want to adopt very different urban policy responses
to the problem of adult uses (and, presumably, other forms of locally unwanted land uses (LULUs) as well). The ability to carry out a policy preference, however, may depend on the government’s ability to compel a
change in the use of property, whether to disperse concentrated adult uses
or to remove them from a neighborhood in order to concentrate them
somewhere else. The point can easily be generalized. Existing uses of
property are often the vestiges of earlier governments’ decisions and may
impede or even prevent changes in policy preferences. Eminent domain
ensures that those vestigial uses do not perpetuate the failed (or at least
anachronistic) policy choices of the past.

29. See, e.g., North Ave. Novelties, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 88 F.3d 441, 444 (7th Cir.
1996) (summarizing approaches).
30. See CITY OF NEW YORK, DEP’T OF CITY PLANNING, ADULT ENTERTAINMENT STUDY
32 (1994).
31. See Did Guiliani Really Clean Up Times Square?, CBS NEWS, Dec. 28, 2007, available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/12/28/politics/main3655538.shtml.
32. See Serkin, Existing Uses, supra note 26 (discussing constitutional protection for
existing uses).
33. See Charles V. Bagli, Slow Economy Likely to Stall Atlantic Yards, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 21, 2008, at C1.
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Reclaiming the Waterfront

Perhaps no figure in New York’s history had more influence on the
City’s development patterns than Robert Moses.34 He created most of the
bridges, parkways, and expressways that connect New York’s five boroughs to each other and to the suburbs.35 In the process, he cut through
existing neighborhoods displacing, by some accounts, 500,000 people.36
His use of eminent domain to effect a particular vision of “urban renewal”
was, for better or worse (and mostly worse), a way of de-entrenching the
more organic development patterns the City had promoted earlier in its history. He was, in part, reclaiming planning authority that New York City
had turned over to private parties.37 More interesting for present purposes,
though, is the current use of eminent domain to begin to undo some of the
Moses legacy and policy choices that he made.
Consider, for example, the decision under Moses to ring the City with
expressways providing what was once easy access into and out of the City
by car. The plan created great benefits for the City at the time—and for
Robert Moses personally—partly because of the scale of the public investment the plans represented.38 The unfortunate long-term result, however,
was to cut the City off from its waterfront, turning great swaths of what
could have been the most desirable real estate into decaying warehouses
and industrial husks.39 Moses’ legacy of roads and bridges are physical
vestiges of specific policy decisions about the relationship between New
York City and its more rural environs, and about how to get from one to the
other.
In more recent years, New York City has tried to change course on some
of these decisions, but it is a process that invariably involves moving or
shifting roads yet again, and displacing some of the uses of land that developed around the existing infrastructure. Consider, for example, the reclamation of the waterfront in Brooklyn, underneath the Promenade, to make
the new Brooklyn Bridge Park. Unfortunately, the Brooklyn Queens Expressway (the BQE in local speak) separates picturesque Brooklyn Heights
34. For the leading historical treatment of Moses’ career, see ROBERT A. CARO, THE
POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK (1999).
35. Id. at 5-9 (describing Moses’ projects).
36. Id. at 20 (“[T]here are available no accurate figures on the total number of people
evicted from their homes for all Robert Moses public works, but the figure is almost certainly close to half a million.”).
37. HENDRIK HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE POWER 45 (1983) (discussing
New York City’s eighteenth century waterfront grants to private parties as abandonment of
future planning power).
38. See CARO, supra note 34, at 5-15 (describing benefits of Moses’ plans).
39. See PHILLIP LOPATE, WATERFRONT: A WALK AROUND MANHATTAN 80 (2004).
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from the new park. In a remarkable feat of engineering, the BQE is cantilevered out from a cliff so that it is below a pedestrian promenade, but
above the river. It therefore serves as a physical barrier to the East River.
To change this land use decision and re-open the waterfront, the City and
the U.S. Department of Transportation are undertaking a project to replace
this critical stretch of the BQE, “[f]amous for its rush-hour traffic,”40 either
by enclosing it in a large tunnel or perhaps by re-routing it under a different
part of Brooklyn. In either case, effectuating this changed policy toward
waterfront development has and will continue to require eminent domain to
overcome the problem of the BQE. The same dynamic is at work throughout the city with its efforts to reclaim the waterfront.
B.

Vested Rights

Vested rights provide a more ephemeral constraint on changes in public
policy. A government might allow or encourage rights to vest in order to
induce reliance by private parties. The paradigmatic example here would
be a government allowing development rights to vest in order to attract a
developer. But more uniquely New York examples exist, too, and include
taxi medallions and a power plant in Brooklyn. These are both examples of
current policies that are—or, in the case of the power plant, almost were—
locked in through vested rights doctrines. If the City wanted to change
course sometime in the future, it might have to use eminent domain to address these and similar places in which vested rights reflect the inherited
policy preferences of a prior government.
1.

Reinventing Taxis

There are perhaps few sites more evocative of New York than the paradigmatic Yellow Cab. A major component of New York City’s transportation system, cabs are ubiquitous throughout the City and, unlike in most cities in the world, can (usually) be hailed easily from (almost) any street
corner. But cabs are more than personal yellow buses. They are also rolling financial assets. Each Yellow Cab in New York is required to obtain a
license to do business and that license takes the form of a transferable medallion.41 Those medallions, limited in number, are worth vast sums of
money. Many yellow cab passengers would be shocked to learn that the

40. NEW YORK ACCELERATED CONSTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, ENVISIONING
THE FUTURE: THE BQE TRIPLE CANTILEVER PROJECT 1 (2006), available at http://www.fhwa
.dot.gov/construction/accelerated/wsbqe06.pdf (describing the project).
41. See Katrina M. Wyman, Is Bentham Right? The Case of New York City Taxi Medallions (Dec. 15, 2008) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author).
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cab is worth more than they are; individual medallions have sold for hundreds of thousands of dollars.42
But what is the property status of those medallions? As Katrina Wyman
details in her thoughtful and careful history, they are licenses conferred by
the City. Originally, licensees would simply return them to the City when
they were done with them, and the City would reissue them to someone
else.43 Over time, however, the city changed course and made them transferable.44 It also restricted the number of medallions in circulation.45 This
scarcity turned the medallions into valuable assets that may represent contractually vested property rights, which, in turn, means that the medallion
licensing system has entrenched a regulatory approach to an entire industry.
This might prove extremely problematic. In the not-too-distant past
when times were more flush, the relative scarcity of cabs became something of a hot-button political issue. Riders complained of the difficulty of
getting cabs at peak times, and many people have complained for years
about the absence of cabs in under-served neighborhoods.46 One potential
response would be to dramatically increase the number of cabs on the road
or even to remove the medallion system in exchange for some other form
of licensing requirement—perhaps a license that is personal to the driver
instead of one that moves with the car.
The problem, of course, is that the existing medallion holders would
fiercely object. Such changes would dramatically reduce, if not wipe out,
the value of their significant investments. It is, of course, possible that the
government would be able to act anyway; that regulatory takings doctrine
or the Due Process Clause, for example, would not stretch far enough to
protect medallions.47 But they might. In the face of constitutional protection, then, the only real option available to the City would be to take the
medallions by eminent domain.48 This is hardly likely to happen any time
soon, but eminent domain would again prove crucial in effectuating a policy change that would result in divesting people of valuable property rights.

42. Tracy Connor, Cab Licenses at Cadillac Prices, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, May 30, 2007
(detailing sale of two medallions for $600,000 each).
43. See Wyman, supra note 41.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. The issue has reared its head again. See Michael M. Grynbaum, Where Do All the
Cabs Go in the Late Afternoon, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2011, at A18.
47. See Wyman, supra note 41 (“[T]he Due Process Clause does not offer medallion
owners much protection, and the Takings Clause likely does not safeguard them at all.”).
48. Alternatively, the governments could use inverse condemnation, but I will avoid distinguishing between them as their differences turn only on regulatory strategy and not on the
underlying substance of the government’s actions.
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Rethinking Inlet Park

The second example is really a case of rights that almost vested but ultimately did not. Nevertheless, it presents the issue of policy change cleanly, and so serves as a particularly useful illustration of the potentially entrenching power of vested rights.
New York City faces real strains on its electricity supply. For years
now, TransGas has been looking to build a new power plant for New York
City. There appears to be demand for a new power plant, but its siting is
controversial. In 1997, the Giuliani administration suggested a location in
Williamsburg, Brooklyn, on the waterfront and near important infrastructure support.49 Plans progressed, and TransGas applied for the various
permits to build the plant. In the meantime, however, Michael Bloomberg
replaced Giuliani as Mayor of New York and had a very different vision for
waterfront development in Brooklyn. Instead of a power plant, he supported building a new park, to be called the Bushwick Inlet Park. This
change in policy preferences put the TransGas power plant at the center of
a controversy over the development of the area and spawned years of litigation.50
The plant triggered a significant fight at the City and community levels
over the use of the property. With the TransGas applications pending, the
Bloomberg administration sought to rezone the property. At the time, proponents of the City’s new plans warned that failure to rezone the property
as soon as possible might allow the power plant to go forward.51 Presumably, they were at least partly concerned that development rights might vest
in the interim, at which point the plant would become a protected prior
non-conforming use in any subsequent rezoning.
As it turns out, the relevant state agency ultimately denied TransGas
permission to build on the site, and courts have rejected appeals of that decision.52 TransGas therefore had no opportunity to obtain vested development rights, and the City never had to use, or even threaten to use, eminent
domain. Nevertheless, the dynamic is clear enough and would be easy to
replicate. A city seeking to immunize development plans from regulatory

49. See Matthew Schuerman, TransGas Maverick Adam Victor Hits City Hall Where It
Hurts, N.Y. OBSERVER, Mar. 6, 2005, available at http://www.observer.com/node/50472.
50. See id.
51. See Hugh Son, Plan Would Stop Plant By Rezone Not So Fast, Critics Say, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29, 2005, available at http://articles.nydailynews.com/2005-04-29/local/
18294987_1_rezoning-affordable-housing-greenpoint.
52. See Samuel Newhouse, Appellate Division Dismisses TransGas Plans for Brooklyn
Power Plant, BROOKLYN DAILY EAGLE, Jan. 12, 2011, available at http://www.brooklyn
eagle.com/categories/category.php?category_id=4&id=31063.
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change can help a private developer obtain vested rights that will then run
against subsequent governments.
C.

Critical Assets

Another form of entrenchment can arise from alienating public assets.
Certain kinds of public resources are intimately bound up with policy decisions, and their sale can therefore significantly constrain subsequent governments’ ability to chart a different course. Here, the examples become
more speculative and include plans that would have locked in policy
through asset sales, had they happened.
1.

Selling Parking Meters

Recently, New York City contemplated selling one of its valuable income-producing assets: its parking meters (and the right to collect fees
from them).53 Modeled on a similar move by Chicago, the City is at least
considering selling off a long-term right to the parking meters for a onetime payment of nearly five billion dollars.54 Such a move would, of
course, be financially entrenching. As one Chicago Alderman characterized the deal Chicago had struck: “It filled the budget gap for one year. . . .
Now, we’ve lost our revenue stream for the next 70 or so years.”55
Of course, eminent domain is no remedy for the lost income stream.
The obligation to pay just compensation means that a government cannot
simply avoid its future debt obligations or recapture lost income for free.
Protection from such financial entrenchment requires a different set of tools
and mechanisms—bankruptcy, and the like—and is therefore outside the
scope of this Symposium.56 But the sale of the parking meters raises a subsidiary set of entrenchment concerns relating to parking enforcement and
parking policy.
The Chicago experience is telling. Shortly after Chicago conveyed away
its parking meters, perceived failures in private operation of the parking

53. See David Seifman, City Mulls $5B Meter Sell-Off, N.Y. POST, Oct. 4, 2010, available at http://www.nypost.com/p/news/local/city_mulls_meter_sell_off_53FEAGOGzvBfxQ
uXDs5JZL.
54. For a summary of the Chicago deal, see Andrew Stern, Chicago Leases Parking Meters for $1.16 Billion, REUTERS, Dec. 2, 2008, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/
bondsNews/idUSN0227950220081202.
55. Seifman, supra note 53.
56. It is, however, taken up in my longer treatment of related issues. See Serkin, Public
Entrenchment, supra note 5.
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system created an enormous political backlash.57 Broken equipment and
generally poor oversight led some Chicago politicians to call for a moratorium on parking enforcement until the private company could upgrade its
operations.58 But imagine if the City had gone a step further and decided
that the sale itself was a mistake. Changing policy and returning the parking system to one of public accountability would then necessitate reacquiring the asset. Depending on the private owner’s willingness to sell voluntarily, that may require eminent domain (or at least its threat).
More broadly, too, privatizing the parking meters may lock in (or foreclose) other policy options, depending on the terms of the contract. Parking
policy, after all, is not just about meters and tickets. Offering free parking
in certain places or during certain times of year can be a tool for stimulating shopping and commercial activity. Reducing the number of available
parking spaces can be a kind of implicit tax on drivers and could therefore
reduce the number of cars in the City. In short, parking systems can be a
crucial link in a broader system of transportation and economic policy, and
privatizing the meters can immunize that particular connection from subsequent policy change—at least in the absence of the power of eminent domain.
2.

Moving Prisoners

New York City has five different jails for its inmates. The largest, by
far, is Rikers Island.59 In the 1990s, New York’s inmate population was on
the decline and it decided to begin closing jails in the outer boroughs, including the Brooklyn House of Detention, and centralizing operations at
Rikers.60 The City anticipated benefitting from economies of scale, and
neighbors of the Brooklyn facility were thrilled that the jail was closing.61
Indeed, the jail was located in a small island of downtown Brooklyn that
had steadfastly resisted the surrounding area’s gentrification.62
Shortly after the Brooklyn House of Detention closed, development in
the neighborhood picked up. New condos went up on all sides, new businesses moved in, and the area underwent a nearly immediate renaissance.

57. See Dan Mihalopoulos, Company Piles Up Profits From City’s Parking Meter Deal,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 20, 2009, at A29 (describing early failings).
58. See id. (describing moratorium on ticket writing).
59. See An Overview of NYC DOC Facilities, N.Y.C. DEP’T OF CORR., http://www.nyc.
gov/html/doc/html/about/facilities_overview.shtml (last visited Apr. 18, 2011).
60. John Eligon, City Moves to Reopen a Brooklyn Jail Shuttered in 2003, but Drops
Plans to Expand It, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2010, at A26.
61. Id.
62. See id.
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Indeed, it was so successful that City Comptroller William Thompson proposed selling the facility and converting it to condos (have fun imagining
possible names for the building!).63
In 2010, the City decided to reopen the jail. Some buildings on Rikers
Island were in bad disrepair, and transporting prisoners back and forth from
Rikers Island proved difficult. The City felt that its best option was to reopen the vacant Brooklyn House of Detention over the strenuous objections
of neighbors.64 This was, of course, only possible because the City had decided not to sell the building. It had, in other words, resisted the potentially
entrenching act of selling the building and instead had kept it vacant and
unused for several years while it was experimenting with its new policies.
But what if it had not? What if Comptroller Thompson had had his way?
The potential role of eminent domain in this scenario requires some unpacking. Its de-entrenching power is easy enough to see if the City had
changed its mind about housing prisoners in between the time it sold the
building and work had begun to demolish or retrofit it. In that case, the
building would still have been there, ready to be reopened, and eminent
domain would have restored the pre-sale status quo. Of course, if the facility were no longer there, siting a new facility becomes a routine land assembly (and LULU) problem. Eminent domain remains a tool for deentrenching the earlier decision, but no more than many government policies that require building any new facility; the problem is the same whether
it is a jail or garage. But the example again stops being routine if there is
something special about the location of the existing House of Detention—it
is near the courthouse and easily accessible by public transportation, for
example. In that case, selling off the lot could limit detention policies for
subsequent governments unless they had the power to reacquire the property.
Here, again, eminent domain never had to be considered because the
City had retained the jail facility—wisely, it seems, in retrospect. But the
example is still a good one. Some kinds of assets are simply difficult to replace after the City decides to sell them, like jails and landfills and others
that require specific locations. A subsequent government may have no opportunity to revisit the policy decision that led to the sale of the asset without the ability to take back the underlying property.

63. See Elizabeth Hays, Sell Shut Downtown Brooklyn Jail to Raise Cash, Bloomberg
Urged, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 29, 2008, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/ny_
local/brooklyn/2008/04/30/2008-04-30_sell_shut_downtown_brooklyn_jail_to_rais.html.
64. Id.
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III. EVALUATING EMINENT DOMAIN
Eminent domain plays an important but seldom observed role in preserving policy flexibility and democratic accountability. But what does this
mean for eminent domain? It is impossible to develop a set of prescriptions
without a more fully formed theory of stability in policymaking. It is,
however, possible to gesture at the kinds of questions that need to be asked,
and at how the appropriate reach of eminent domain depends on the answers.
Imagine a world in which policy had no inertial force. In this kind of
science fictional alternate reality, the status quo would hold no sway, and
governments could truly legislate as if on a blank slate every day. Though
perhaps a halcyon vision for some, most people would find this a gross
dystopia, a kind of Logan’s Run of private rights.65
The problem, in its most general form, is that some measure of stability
in legal regimes is necessary for people to rely on government policies.
Reliance, in turn, is a prerequisite for inducing investments, creating psychological stability, reducing agency monitoring costs, and more. Policy
friction, in other words, serves important interests. Calibrating eminent
domain, then, should be attentive to these twin goals of preserving flexibility and inducing reliance on government precommitments.
From the perspective of entrenchment, what, then, should eminent domain look like? It should be available as a backstop when a government
wants to change course. Without eminent domain, a government could use
private rights—property conveyances, vested rights, physical development,
and contractual obligations—to immunize policies from change. The private rights holders might be complicit in the effort. They might be developers seeking to vest their rights or companies seeking long-term benefits
like parking meters, regardless of the cost to the public. But the rights
holders might also be “innocent” third parties, private landowners who
have no independent interest in the temporal reach of a government policy
but who nevertheless seize good land use opportunities when they arise, or
build in a way that takes advantage of existing roads, waterfront access, or
regulatory conditions. In either case, private rights threaten to entrench
government policies in the absence of eminent domain.
On the other hand, eminent domain cannot be so easy to use that its
availability undermines private reliance on government precommitments.
65. See LOGAN’S RUN (Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer 1976). In this classic science fiction
film, all people enter the “Carousel” at the age of thirty, where they believe they will be reborn as infants. In fact, they are simply killed, so that there are no old people on earth. The
analogy here is that private rights would terminate automatically and prematurely so that no
stale rights would exist.
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If eminent domain were free or very easy to exercise, then it might make
government policies too malleable. People would not build, and it could
become prohibitively difficult to stimulate private investment. As a deentrenching tool, eminent domain must therefore be widely available but
sufficiently costly (politically and economically) for governments to exercise, so that private parties can be induced to rely on government commitments. Interestingly, the fair market value compensation requirement,
coupled with the due process costs of eminent domain, generate outcomes
that at least resemble an appropriate compromise between these two competing pressures.
Whether or not it is well calibrated today, it is at least important to recognize that the availability of eminent domain, at some price, is crucial to
preventing entrenchment. Public policy decisions are not just reflected in
legislative enactments and municipal ordinances. They are also captured in
the inter-connected web of the built environment and vested contractual
and property rights that often have more binding power than inherently
mutable public laws. Eminent domain, therefore, serves an important role
in preserving subsequent governments’ ability to respond to the will of
their constituents.

